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An experiment is reported in which subjects assigned probabilities to the 
outcomes of basketball games and to the truth of general-knowledge items. 
Three different methods were used for eliciting subjects’ probability judg- 
ments. Subjects were more successful in selecting answers to the general- 
knowledge questions than they were in picking basketball game winners. The 
overall accuracy of their probability judgments for general-knowledge items 
was superior, too. On the other hand, subjects’ judgments about general- 
knowledge questions were more overconfident, more poorly calibrated, and 
included greater scatter. One method of probability assessment gave subjects 
an irrelevant cue. This was found to increase confidence and overconfidence 
and to hurt calibration. Correlations between measures of performance on 
general-knowledge questions and basketball predictions showed substantial 
individual consistency in confidence, but only weak consistency in other com- 
ponents of judgment quality. Theoretical and practical implications are dis- 
cussed. 0 1987 Academic Press, Inc. 
When forecasters and other judges of unknown events are not sure 
what outcome will occur, it is important that their judgments be appropri- 
ately qualified. If such judges can accurately assess the probabilities of 
outcomes, decision makers can make trade-offs between the values of 
various outcomes and the chances of their occurrence. A substantial 
amount of research has been conducted to evaluate the quality of proba- 
bilistic judgments, almost all of it focusing on calibration. Probabilistic 
judgments are said to be well calibrated when the relative frequencies of 
events match the corresponding judged probabilities. Precipitation fore- 
casts would be perfectly calibrated, for example, if it rains on 10% of 
days when the forecast is a 10% probability of rain, on 20% of the days 
when the forecast is for a 20% probability of rain, etc. Professional 
weather forecasters and professional oddsmakers provide well-calibrated 
judgments, but almost all other probability judgments that have been ex- 
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amined are overconfident and poorly calibrated (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, 
& Phillips, 1982). 
The probability judgments used in practical decision situations almost 
always apply to (currently unknowable) future events, such as the 
weather, the performance of a potential employee, or the helpfulness of a 
medical treatment for a patient with a given diagnosis. Most psycholog- 
ical research on probability judgments, however, has used general-knowl- 
edge questions whose answers are already known to the researchers. 
These are often an assortment of items about history, vocabulary, geog- 
raphy, literature, and science, sometimes referred to as “almanac ques- 
tions.” There are clear advantages of using such questions. Perhaps the 
most important is that one does not have to wait to learn the answers. 
This facilitates the research process and makes it possible to give imme- 
diate feedback to the subjects in training studies (cf. Fischer, 1982; Lich- 
tenstein & Fischhoff, 1980). 
Unfortunately, two potentially critical differences between the tasks in 
studies using general-knowledge questions and those in real-world fore- 
casting raise questions about generalizability. The first difference is that 
real-world forecasters recognize that future events are unknown to 
anyone and are not definitely answerable at the time predictions are 
made, while subjects in the laboratory are aware that answers to general- 
knowledge questions are known to the researchers and hence potentially 
knowable by the subjects themselves. This difference may create or in- 
crease overconfidence in the laboratory. Past research has typically indi- 
cated that judgments about general-knowledge questions are indeed more 
confident than those about future events (Fischhoff & MacGregor, 1982; 
Wright, 1982; Wright & Wisudha, 1982). 
The second important difference between laboratory and real-world 
probability judgments is procedural. Real-world forecasters typically as- 
sign probabilities to predefined target events, e.g., “Rain will fall,” “The 
employee will succeed, ” “The patient will live.” Probabilities for the 
target event are given on a scale from 0 to 100%. In most laboratory 
studies, however, judgments are made by a two-step procedure. Subjects 
are usually given two alternative answer to each question. First they 
choose the answer they believe is more likely to be correct. Then they 
assign a probability to their preferred answer using a scale from 50 to 
100%. It is possible that the act of choosing an answer before assigning a 
probability may affect the judgment process and the probability assigned. 
Self-perception theory (Bern, 1967) and early versions of the theory of 
cognitive dissonance (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Festinger, 1957) suggest 
that freely choosing a course of action will increase the attractiveness of 
the chosen action and decrease the attractiveness of alternative actions. 
Thus the two-step procedure (choose then judge) common in laboratory 
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studies of probability judgment may contribute to the observed overcon- 
fidence. An exploratory study reported by Fischhoff, Slavic, and Lich- 
tenstein (1977, Experiment 1) provided some support for this hypothesis. 
In the Fischhoff et al. study, subjects were completely sure 22% of the 
time when they used a two-step procedure and approximately 18% of the 
time when they used a one-step procedure. However, the results of that 
study were not definitive because the specific questions differed some- 
what for the subjects using the two different response methods. 
The current study was conducted in order to examine the effects on 
probability judgment accuracy of subject matter (predictions of the out- 
come of basketball games versus general-knowledge questions) and of 
assessment methods (choice versus no-choice and 50-point scale versus 
lOO-point scale). The study also tested the consistency of individual ten- 
dencies in the accuracy of probability judgments about general-knowl- 
edge questions and about the outcomes of future basketball games. De- 
termining the extent of such consistency is important for the task of se- 
lecting and training forecasters. 
There are several separable dimensions of probability judgment accu- 
racy. Judges may differ, for example, in the proportion of times they 
identify the outcome that occurs. They can also differ in the degree of 
systematic overconfidence or underconfidence of their judgments and/or 
in the amount of random variability in their assessments. Thus, the issues 
described above were examined as they pertained to aspects of judgment 




One hundred twenty-eight paid subjects from the local university com- 
munity participated in the experiment. Subjects filled out the experi- 
mental questionnaires in a classroom setting. Completion of the ques- 
tionnaires took about 40 min. 
Design 
The factors varied in the experiment were the topic of the judgments 
and the method of probability assessment. Each subject answered 51 
questions on each of two topics: (a) outcomes of upcoming professional 
basketball games and (b) two-alternative general-knowledge questions. 
The general-knowledge questions covered a wide variety of subjects. The 
first three questions, for example, were these: (1) A Japan finish is char- 
acteristically (a) smooth and glossy or (b) dulled by hand rubbing; (2) 
Which is the greatest distance from Paris? (a) Honolulu or (b) Cairo; and 
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(3) The motto of the Boy Scouts of America is (a) be prepared or (b) be 
helpful. 
The basketball questions asked which team would win each of 51 Na- 
tional Basketball Association games to be played in the next few weeks. 
Each question gave the date of the game and identified the home team 
and the visiting team. As background information, the questionnaire in- 
cluded the divisional standings of all the teams. Thus all subjects had 
some information on which to base their predictions. It was anticipated 
that subjects would be more confident about the general-knowledge ques- 
tions than about basketball predictions. 
Each subject was randomly assigned to use one of three methods of 
probability assessment. In the standard Choice-50 method, the subject 
first circled one of the two possible answers for a question and then as- 
signed a probability from .50 to 1 .OO that the chosen answer was correct. 
In the No-Choice-100 method, one of the two possible answers was al- 
ready circled. Subjects were correctly informed that the decision about 
which answer had been circled was made by flipping a coin. Their task 
was to assign a probability from 0.00 to 1.00 that the precircled answer 
was correct. In the Choice-100 method the subject first circled his or her 
preferred answer and then assigned a probability from 0.00 to 1.00 that 
the chosen alternative was correct. (It would be sensible for subjects in 
the Choice-100 condition to use only the top half of the probability scale.) 
The Choice-50 and No-Choice-100 methods were included to test the im- 
pact of choice on probability judgment accuracy. In comparing only these 
two methods, however, effects of choice would be confounded with any 
possible effects of scale length. The Choice-100 method was included to 
complete the design and eliminate the confounding of scale length and 
choice. 
For comparability with the other methods, data from the No-Choice- 
100 method were recoded in the following fashion: If a probability greater 
than 20 was given, the circled answer and probability were taken liter- 
ally, i.e., the subject was coded as choosing the answer that was precir- 
cled and giving the assigned probability. If a probability below 20 was 
assigned, the subject was coded as choosing the answer that was not 
precircled and assigning a probability equal to 1.00 minus the marked 
probability. If the probability of exactly 20 was given, an answer was 
randomly selected and the probability of SO was assigned. These re- 
codings were done by computer. Responses from the other response 
methods were not recoded. It was hypothesized that subjects would be 
more confident in the choice conditions. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to answer either the general-knowl- 
edge questions or the basketball questions first. So the experiment con- 
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sisted of a 2 (topic) x 3 (method) x 2 (order) factorial design. Topic 
varied within subjects while method and order varied between subjects. 
Accuracy Measures 
Brier (1950) proposed an overall measure of the accuracy of probabi- 
listic judgments, now known as the “Brier score.” In order to provide 
separate measures of different aspects of judgment accuracy, Sanders 
(1963), Murphy (1973), and Yates (1982) have proposed decompositions 
of the Brier score. That is, they have divided the Brier score into several 
components. The measures used to describe performance in this study 
included the Brier score, all components of the above mentioned decom- 
positions, and several other descriptive statistics. This report focuses on 
seven measures that are particularly important and easy to interpret: the 
Brier score, reliability-in-the-small, proportion correct, mean confidence, 
mean overconfidence, slope, and scatter. 
The Brier score is an overall measure of judgment accuracy. Low Brier 
scores indicate good judgment. Proportion correct, mean confidence, and 
mean overconfidence are self-explanatory. Scatter is variability in as- 
signed probabilities that does not correspond to differences in outcome. 
Low scatter is a desirable characteristic of probabilistic judgments. The 
slope indicates the extent to which the forecaster assigns higher probabil- 
ities to events that occur than to those that do not. High slope indicates 
good performance on this component of probabilistic judgment. Reli- 
ability-in-the-small is a measure of the extent that the probabilistic judg- 
ments are well calibrated, i.e., that the proportion correct at each level of 
confidence equals the stated level of confidence. Low scores on reli- 
ability-in-the-small indicate good performance; a score of zero indicates 
perfect calibration. Formal definitions of these measures follow. 
Brier score. Let f denote the probability assigned to the target event 
the judge is trying to predict. An “outcome index” d for the target event 
is defined as follows: d = 1, if the target event occurs, d = 0, if the target 
event does not occur. The outcome index may be thought of as the proba- 
bility that would have been assigned by a clairvoyant. The Brier score or 
“mean probability score” (B) is the mean squared difference between 
the stated probability and the outcome index: fi = C(f - 4*/N, where 
N is the number of judgments. Clearly, a low Brier score indicates good 
performance. In the current study and many other studies of probabilistic 
judgment, there were two alternative answers to each question. So an 
individual who had no reason to prefer one answer over another should 
assign a probability of .5 to either answer. An individual answering each 
question this way would receive a Brier score of .2.5. Thus, Brier scores 
over .25 indicate especially poor performance. 
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Proportion correct, mean confidence, and mean overcon.dence. In 
the present study, and other studies using general-knowledge questions 
rather than repeated predictions of the same type of event (e.g., rain, 
worker success, home team victory), the target event was defined as 
“My preferred answer is correct.” Thus, the mean outcome index, Z, is 
equivalent to the proportion correct. Similarly, with this definition, the 
mean probability assigned, J is equivalent to the judge’s “mean confi- 
dence” that he or she has selected the correct answer. The difference 
between mean confidence and proportion correct, f - a, is called the 
“mean overconfidence” when positive and the “mean underconfidence” 
when negative. A more general term for7 - Z is the “bias.” In studies 
using different definitions of the target event, bias refers to something 
other than over/underconfidence. In precipitation forecasts, for example, 
bias may refer to a tendency to judge rain to be more likely than it 
really is. 
Covariance graphs, slope, and scatter. The scatter, slope, and some 
other aspects of forecasting performance are best illustrated in a graph- 
ical display called a “covariance graph” (Yates, 1982; Yates & Curley, 
1985). Figure 1 shows the covariance graphs for two sets of probability 
judgments. The outcome index defines the horizontal axis of a covariance 
graph. For convenience, the events identified with the alternative values 
of the outcome index (answer incorrect, answer correct) are also indi- 
cated. The vertical axis of a covariance graph indicates the various prob- 
ability judgments the person makes. In studies like the current one, 
where the target event is defined as “My preferred answer is correct,” 
covariance graphs are essentially histograms of probability judgments 
separately for correct and incorrect answers. The mean probability judg- 
ment within each histogram is indicated in the graph (& when incorrect,& 
when correct) and connected by a line. The difference between these two 
means (& - Jb), or the slope, is an indication of the judge’s success in 
assigning higher probabilities when his or her answers are correct than 
when they are incorrect. 
Some judges may feel that they cannot distinguish among questions 
which they are more and less likely to answer correctly, so they assign 
the same probability for each question-leading to a slope of zero. Most 
judges, however, believe they have a basis for varying their probability 
judgments. If they are correct in this belief, at least some of the vari- 
ability in their assigned probabilities manifests itself in a positive slope. 
Unless their judgments are perfectly discriminative, some of the vari- 
ability appears as variability of probability judgments within each histo- 
gram. 
The variability or scatter of probability judgments within each histo- 
gram is useless variance as far as anticipating the target event is con- 
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cerned. It is analogous to error variance in analysis of variance. An 
overall measure of the amount of scatter in a person’s judgments is the 
weighted mean of the variances within the two histograms: 
Scatter = (N, Varf, + No VarfJ 
w, + NJ, 
where N, is the number of instances in which the event occurs, No is the 
number of instances in which it does not, and Var fi and Var f0 are the 
conditional variances in those two sets of occasions. Scatter will be par- 
ticularly high if the probability judgments are influenced by consider- 
ations that are not indicative of the outcome. 
Reliability diagrams, calibration, and reliability-in-the-small. The ten- 
dency of judgments at various levels of confidence to be correct, incor- 
rect, overconfident, underconfident, and well calibrated are best illus- 
trated in figures called reliability diagrams. In such diagrams, the relative 
frequency or proportion correct (3) for each level of probability is plotted 
against the assigned probability. If the judgments are perfectly calibrated, 
all the points will fall on the diagonal line. Reliability-in-the-small is the 
mean squared deviation of the points from this line (weighted by the 
number of observations): 
Reliability-in-the-Small = 
where 3, is the relative frequency or proportion correct over the Nj occa- 
sions when the judge assigns probability fj and N is the total number of 
judgments. In calculating reliability-in-the-small, all probability judg- 
ments are rounded to the nearest .I. A reliability-in-the-small of zero in- 
dicates perfect calibration. Figure 2 presents reliability diagrams for the 
same subjects shown in Fig. 1. In panel A of the figure we note that the 
subject was underconfident when assigning the probability of .6, but 
overconfident when assigning probabilities of .9 and 1.0. The subject 
whose judgments are shown on panel B of the figure was overconfident 
when assigning probabilities of .6 and made few assignments more ex- 
treme than .6. See Yates (1982) and Yates and Curley (1985) for more 
complete descriptions of the covariance decomposition of the Brier score 
and discussion of other decompositions. 
It should be noted that the components of decompositions of the Brier 
score are not independent of each other. A change in judgment that alters 
the score on one component will usually alter the scores on other compo- 
nents as well. Basing one’s probability judgments on an irrelevant cue, 
for example, tends to increase both miscalibration (reliability-in-the- 
small) and scatter. A change in judgment that improves one component 
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may even hurt performance on another component. For example, it is 
possible to eliminate scatter by assigning the same probability on each 
judgment, but this improvement would prevent the judge from obtaining 
a positive slope. Given the desirability of probability judgments that are 
correlated with outcomes, judges are usually willing to accept some 
scatter in order to increase slope. The complexity of the relations among 
the components highlights the danger of excluding important measures 
from a study. 
Before presenting the results, we wish to bring attention to some issues 
which have their origin in how the target event is defined. All schemes for 
analyzing probability judgment accuracy require a target event that can 
be repeated over a large number of occasions. Since every event literally 
occurs only once, the requirement is actually met by examining a set of 
events that are “essentially similar” to one another. For certain judgment 
tasks this requirement is easy to satisfy. For instance, in weather fore- 
casting, most observers concede that the event “Precipitation occurs” is 
substantially the same every time a meteorologist makes a prediction. In 
other judgment situations, the events of inherent interest are very dif- 
ferent from one another. As an example, in the study by Fischhoff and 
MacGregor (1982), one judgment item concerned the victor in an up- 
coming mayoral election, while another was about who would win a par- 
ticular baseball game. The alternatives in general-knowledge questions 
also constitute essentially unique “events.” 
Despite the seeming incomparability of the events involved, re- 
searchers have still sought conclusions about judgment tendencies indi- 
cated by responses to collections of items about one-of-a-kind future 
events and general knowledge. This is done, as in the present study, by 
recoding individual responses into a form whereby the designated target 
event does appear to be essentially the same from one item to the next. 
Namely, the subject picks one of the alternatives as the best prospect and 
then indicates a degree of certainty in the selection. The target event 
subsequently encoded for the subject is “My preferred answer is cor- 
rect.” There is the option to employ this type of “internal coding” with 
replicable events, too, although this is virtually never done in practice. 
For example, a weather forecaster could pick either “Precipitation” or 
“No Precipitation,” then state a 50-100% probability that the chosen 
condition will prevail. That judgment would be interpreted as applying to 
“My chosen alternative will occur.” Internal coding was employed with 
both types of questions in the present study to permit comparisons be- 
tween judgments about basketball games and general-knowledge ques- 
tions . 
Internal coding appears innocuous. But it creates surprising problems 
of interpretation for some standard measures of judgment accuracy, 
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problems that do not exist with externally coded replicable events. For 
instance, Yates (1982, pp. 153-154) alluded to the ambiguities of resolu- 
tion measures for internally coded responses. In the present study slope 
is the statistic whose meaning is complicated by internal coding. If, as in 
this study, the target event is “My preferred answer is correct,” probabil- 
ities below 5 are meaningless. Thus, the largest possible slope value is 
5. This would be achieved if a probability judgment of 1 .O is given when- 
ever the judge picks the correct alternative, and .5 whenever the judge 
selects the wrong one. However, the latter condition seems unreason- 
able, and certainly unlikely to occur. In essence, it says that, whenever 
the preferred answer is going to be wrong, the judge reports probability 
.5, which normally indicates complete uncertainty. Because .5 is always 
reported under these circumstances, in a sense the judge “knows” that 
the preferred answer is incorrect. And with two alternatives, if one 
knows that one alternative is wrong, the other must be concluded to be 
right. So a judge who is capable of attaining the maximum slope should 
be able to always pick the correct alternative. If a judge in fact consis- 
tently made the proper selection, there would be only one conditional 
mean judgment, J in the previous notation. Hence, the slope, fi - &, 
would be undefined. 
It remains an open problem to determine appropriate statistical treat- 
ment and interpretation of measures such as resolution and slope for in- 
ternally coded events when the judge demonstrates “perfect knowledge” 
of the correct answers, i.e., when he or she assigns only one probability 
level and always chooses the correct answer, or when he or she assigns 
exactly two probability levels: one when right and the other when wrong. 
For the purpose of interpretive clarity, it is fortunate that the ideal of 
perfect knowledge was never approached in the current study. In the case 
of slope, when the judge does not achieve perfect knowledge, it is clear 
that larger slopes are better than smaller ones. 
RESULTS 
Each of the performance measures was subjected to a topic x method 
x order repeated-measures analysis of variance. Order did not have sig- 
nificant effects and is not discussed. In general, the results were domi- 
nated by main effects of topic and method. Table 1 lists the mean and 
standard deviation of each of the seven focal measures for the six cells in 
the topic x method design. Table 2 lists the same kinds of statistics for 
six supplementary measures. 
Topic Effects 
The two topics, basketball and general-knowledge, were significantly 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































204 RONIS AND YATES 
effects were all stable across the three methods of probability assess- 
ment. Most interesting was the finding that, for some aspects ofjudgment 
accuracy, subjects’ judgments about general-knowledge questions were 
better than their judgments about future basketball games, but for other 
aspects, this was reversed. 
Performance on general-knowledge questions was significantly better 
than on basketball questions on the following measures: Brier score, pro- 
portion correct, and slope (see Table 1). In fact, the slope for subjects’ 
basketball predictions was not significantly greater than zero, t(127) = 
1.33, p > .l, meaning that the probabilities subjects assigned to basket- 
ball outcomes were not reliably higher when they were right about the 
outcome than when they were wrong about it. In contrast, judgments 
were more confident, more overconfident, and showed worse reliability- 
in-the-small, and more scatter for general-knowledge questions than for 
basketball questions (see Table 1). 
Figure 1 shows the covariance graphs for typical performances on gen- 
eral-knowledge questions (IA) and basketball questions (IB), both using 
the standard Choice-50 response method. Several characteristics identi- 
fied by the statistical analysis are illustrated in these graphs, notably the 
higher proportion correct, higher confidence, and higher scatter of judg- 
ments about general-knowledge questions. (Overconfidence and slope 
were not noticeably different for these two subjects.) 
Figure 2 shows the reliability diagrams for the same two subjects 
whose judgments were shown in Fig. 1. This figure also illustrates the 
higher confidence and proportion correct for the general-knowledge 
questions. In addition, the better calibration (lower reliability-in-the- 
small) for basketball questions is apparent. 
Figure 3 shows the reliability diagrams for the six combinations of 
topics and methods in the experiment collapsed over subjects and order. 
The calibration curves are generally below the diagonal, indicating over- 
confidence. A higher proportion of correct answers and a greater mean 
confidence are apparent for general-knowledge questions than for bas- 
ketball questions. Note that reliability diagrams for group data cannot be 
counted on to provide information about reliability-in-the-small for the 
typical subject. If half the subjects were overconfident and half were un- 
derconfident, the grouped data might suggest perfect calibration. 
In general, subjects were better able to select the correct answer on 
general-knowledge questions than for basketball predictions, but were 
less able to assign confidence levels (probability judgments) that corre- 
sponded to their success in prediction. It is notable that subjects were 
completely sure (100% confident) about 25.0% of their general-knowl- 
edge answers but expressed such certainty for only 1.3% of their basket- 
ball predictions (see Table 2). These sure answers were correct 85% of 
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the time for general-knowledge questions and 69% of the time for basket- 
ball predictions (see Fig. 3). 
Method Effects and Interactions 
The effects of the method of probability assessment were more subtle 
than the topic effects. Brier scores were best (lowest) using the Choice- 
100 method, worst with the No-Choice-100 method, and intermediate 
with the Choice-50 method. However, neither proportion correct nor 
slope differed reliably across the three methods. 
Contrary to our predictions, confidence and overconfidence were 
highest with the No-Choice-l00 method, lowest with the Choice-l00 
method, and intermediate with the Choice-50 method. Method x topic 
interactions indicated that these main effects were weaker for basketball 
predictions than for general-knowledge questions. Reliability-in-the-small 
showed this same method main effect. 
Scatter was higher with the Choice-100 method than with the other 
methods. A method x topic interaction indicated that this effect held for 
general-knowledge questions, but was nonexistent for basketball predic- 
tions. See Table 1 for descriptive and inferential statistics for all seven 
measures. 
No-Choice-100 method. Why did the No-Choice-l00 method increase 
confidence, overconfidence, and miscalibration (reliability-in-the-small)? 
With this method, subjects saw one of the two answers circled and 
judged the probability that the circled answer was correct. So it is pos- 
sible that subjects (consciously or unconsciously) took the circle as a cue 
to the correct answer, even though they had been informed that it was 
irrelevant. 
To test this possibility, several additional measures were derived and 
subjected to analysis of variance: (a) the proportion of times subjects 
agreed with the precircled answer (whether or not they were in the No- 
Choice-100 condition), (b) mean probability assigned to the precircled an- 
swers, (c) mean confidence when subjects agreed with the precircled an- 
swer, and (d) mean confidence when subjects disagreed with the precir- 
cled answer.’ Means and standard deviations for these measures and 
other supplementary measures are shown in Table 2. These analyses indi- 
cated that subjects using the No-Choice-100 method were more likely to 
agree with the precircled answers than were subjects using the other 
1 In the No-Choice-100 condition, subjects were coded as agreeing with the precircled 
answer if they assigned it a probability greater than SO. When subjects in this condition 
assigned probabilities of exactly .50, their preference (for or against the precircled answer) 
was randomly assigned. 
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methods. In addition, these subjects assigned higher probabilities to the 
precircled answers than subjects using the other methods assigned to 
these answers. Thus, the circle acted as a cue to affect judgment. 
However, this cuing effect is only part of the explanation of the high 
confidence in the No-Choice-100 condition. This was discovered by ex- 
amining confidence separately for cases in which the subject agreed and 
disagreed with the precircled answer. Whether subjects agreed or dis- 
agreed with the precircled answers, they were more confident when they 
had used the No-Choice-100 method than when they had used the other 
techniques (see Table 2). So there must be some other process contrib- 
uting to the high confidence with No-Choice-100. 
Choice-100 method. Why were confidence, overconfidence, and reli- 
ability-in-the-small lowest, and scatter highest with the Choice-100 
method? This method allowed subjects to choose an answer and then 
assign a probability lower than .5 to their preferred answer. Twenty of the 
42 subjects using the Choice-100 method gave one or more probabilities 
below S. Of these 20 subjects, 6 gave only one probability below S; one 
subject assigned 56 probabilities below .5 (out of 102 questions), and the 
remaining 13 subjects gave an average of 9.38 such probabilities. About 
two-thirds of the probabilities below .5 were assigned to general-knowl- 
edge questions. Since there are only two possible answers to each ques- 
tion, assigning a probability below .5 is peculiar and difficult to interpret. 
It could mean that the subject actually prefers the answer he or she did 
not circle (a failure to follow the instruction to circle the answer thought 
to be correct) or it could mean that the subject is misusing the probability 
scale -assigning probabilities near zero instead of .50 when very unsure 
of the answer. 
An implicit scoring technique can provide information about the rela- 
tive popularity of these two misuses of the response method. In the im- 
plicit technique, whenever a subject reports a probability below .5, the 
subject’s choice is recoded to indicate a preference for the answer not 
circled. Since subjects usually choose the correct answer, implicit 
scoring will improve the overall proportion correct if that is their 
meaning. On the other hand, if subjects are misusing the probability 
scale, implicit scoring will tend to lower the proportion of correct 
FIG. 1. Covariance graphs for typical performances on general-knowledge and basketball 
questions, using the Choice-50 method. Panel A displays the general-knowledge judgments 
of the subject whose Brier score for general-knowledge questions was closest to the median 
of subjects using the Choice-50 method. Panel B displays the basketball judgments of the 
subject whose Brier score for basketball was closest to the median using the same method. 
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choices. As it turned out, implicit scoring decreased the proportion cor- 
rect for the Choice-100 condition from .650 to .635. So most of the low 
probabilities are the result of misuse of the probability scale itself. 
Examination of individual subjects’ data revealed, however, that low 
probabilities had different meanings for different subjects. The subject 
with the best Brier score for general-knowledge questions, for example, 
assigned nine probabilities below 5. In each case, the circled answer was 
incorrect (see Figure 4A). Apparently, the subject was using the proba- 
bility scale correctly, but preferred the answer he/she did not circle. In 
contrast, the subject with the worst Brier score for basketball questions 
assigned most probabilities below 5, but most of the circled answers 
were correct (see Fig. 4B). It seems likely that this subject was misusing 
the probability scale. 
To see whether these probabilities below .5 were responsible for the 
low confidence, low overconfidence, low reliability-in-the-small, and 
high scatter for the Choice-100 methods, data from this method were 
reanalyzed after deleting subjects who gave probabilities below .5. It 
should be recognized that deleting a nonrandom sample of subjects from 
one condition while not deleting a comparable group from the other con- 
ditions may bias comparisons between conditions. Though we are aware 
of this potential problem, we have not been able to think of a better way 
to analyze these data to determine the effects of subjects who assigned 
probabilities below .5 when using the Choice-100 method. We, therefore, 
present the results in the following paragraph while urging caution in in- 
terpreting the comparisons between conditions that are described. 
Deleting the subjects who assigned probabilities below .5 in the 
Choice-100 condition reduced scatter from .027 to .020 and eliminated the 
significant effect of method on scatter, indicating that the high scatter for 
the Choice-l00 method was entirely due to subjects who gave probabili- 
ties less than .5. Deleting these subjects also increased mean confidence 
(from .680 to .694) and overconfidence (from .028 to .038). However, 
confidence and overconfidence were still noticeably lower for the 
Choice-l00 method than for other methods, indicating that these effects 
were not completely due to failure to follow instructions and misunder- 
standings of the probability scale. Deleting these subjects actually re- 
duced reliability-in-the-small (from .042 to .032). Thus, the probabilities 
FIG. 2. Reliability diagrams for typical performances on general-knowledge and basket- 
ball questions, using the Choice-50 method. These reliability diagrams show the proportion 
correct for judgments made within levels of confidence. The number of judgments at each 
level of confidence is indicated by the size of the circle and by the associated number. This 
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FIG. 3. Reliability diagrams for grouped data from the six combinations of topics (bas- 
ketball and general-knowledge) and assessment methods used in the study. Data are col- 
lapsed over subjects and orders. The number of judgments at each level of confidence is 
indicated by the size of the circle or dot and by the associated number. 
below .5 were not at all responsible for the good calibration for the 
Choice-100 method. Though the processes (other than failure to follow 
instructions and misuse of the probability scale) that produced the effects 
of the Choice-100 method are not known, it is notable that the proportion 
of SO (complete uncertainty) responses was higher using the Choice-100 
method than for the other methods (see Table 2). 
Correlational Analyses 
To test for consistency in probability judgment performance, Pearson 
correlations were computed between the accuracy scores for general- 
knowledge questions and for basketball predictions. To ensure that these 
correlations indicated individual consistency, rather than method effects, 
they were computed while partialing out the effects of response method. 
Modest, but significant, correlations were found between Brier scores 
4124) = .21, p < 105, overconfidence, r(124) = .25, p < .Ol, scatter, 
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FIG. 4. Covariance graphs for two subjects who assigned probabilities below 50 in the 
Choice-100 condition. 
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r(124) = .23, p < .Ol, and reliability-in-the-small, 4124) = .27, p < .Ol 
on the two topics. The strongest correlation between scores on the two 
topics was for mean confidence, r(124) = SO, p < .OOl. There were no 
reliable correlations between the proportions of correct answers chosen, 
r(124) = .12, p > .05 or between the slopes, r(124) = .05, p > .05, on the 
two topics. Thus, the only substantial consistency was in confidence 
levels. 
DISCUSSION 
In this experiment, subjects reported probability judgments for the 
outcomes of upcoming basketball games and for the answers to two-al- 
ternative, general-knowledge questions. Three methods were used for as- 
sessing subjects’ judgments. Reliable and interpretable differences in 
various components of judgment accuracy were observed as a function of 
topic and method of probability assessment. The major findings of the 
study are briefly summarized and discussed. This is followed by a general 
discussion of the utility of measuring separable components of proba- 
bility judgment accuracy. 
Topic Effects 
Subjects were more accurate in selecting answers to the general- 
knowledge questions than they were in predicting which basketball team 
would win each game. However, their judgments about general-knowl- 
edge questions were also more confident, more overconfident, more 
poorly calibrated, and showed more scatter. Subjects said they were ab- 
solutely sure about general-knowledge questions more than 15 times as 
often as they said they were sure about basketball predictions. These 
differences in confidence are too great to be explained simply as a result 
of the difference in question difficulty. 
There appears to be an important difference between judgments about 
general-knowledge questions and predictions of basketball outcomes. 
Subjects were much more likely to recognize that they cannot know for 
sure what the outcome of a basketball game will be than they are to rec- 
ognize the limitations of their general knowledge. The lower level of con- 
fidence and greater (appropriate) reluctance to express complete cer- 
tainty about future events has been observed in several studies by other 
researchers (Fischhoff & MacGregor, 1982; Wright, 1982; Wright & Wi- 
sudha, 1982). One implication of this difference is that the results of 
studies using general-knowledge questions may not generalize to the 
real-world problem of forecasting future events. 
Individual Consistency 
Correlations between measures of performance on general-knowledge 
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questions and those same measures applied to basketball predictions 
showed substantial consistency in mean confidence, but only weak con- 
sistency in other components of judgment quality. These findings are 
consonant with the results of Ramanaiah and Goldberg (1977), who found 
more individual consistency for confidence than for 11 other components 
of judgment. Clearly, skill.in probability judgment is not a unitary trait. 
There are probably a multiplicity of skills and knowledge that allow a 
person to do a good job in making probability judgments. The skills and 
knowledge required apparently differ from one content domain to an- 
other. Like the main effects of topic discussed above, these findings raise 
the question of the generalizability of findings from one type of judgment 
to another. 
Method Effects 
No-Choice-ZOO. In the No-Choice-100 method of measuring subjective 
probabilities, a randomly selected answer to each question was circled. 
Subjects were to judge the probability that the precircled answer was 
correct. This method produced the worst Brier scores, the worst calibra- 
tion, the highest confidence, and the highest overconfidence. Subjects 
using this method assigned higher probabilities to the precircled answers 
than subjects using the other methods assigned to the same answers. 
Thus, the circling acted as a cue, even though subjects were informed 
that the decision about which answer was circled was made by flipping a 
coin. 
The cuing effect was at best partially responsible for subjects’ high 
confidence with the No-Choice-100 method. Subjects were most confi- 
dent with this method even when they disagreed with the precircled an- 
swer. At this point we can only speculate about other processes leading 
to their high confidence. Perhaps seeing an answer circled focused sub- 
jects’ attention on one alternative so they tended not to consider the pros 
and cons of the other answer. This might have led to more extreme prob- 
ability assignments because the smaller sample of possible arguments 
would be more likely than a large sample to be one-sided (via the law of 
large numbers). It is plausible that the same mechanisms underlie both 
the present results and supra-additivity (Wright & Whalley, 1983). The 
latter is the phenomenon whereby the sum of subjects’ probability judg- 
ments for all the events in a sample space partition tends to be greater- 
often much greater-than 100%. 
Studies reported by Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1980) and by 
Fischhoff and MacGregor (1982) demonstrated that inducing subjects to 
consider the pros and cons of both alternatives reduced confidence and 
overconfidence. Attending to arguments against one’s preferred answer 
seemed particularly important. Similarly, studies of social judgment have 
demonstrated that focusing attention on one possibility, or explaining one 
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potential alternative can increase the perceived likelihood of that possi- 
bility. Further, inducing people to consider the opposite possibility can 
reduce or eliminate the bias (Anderson & Sechler, 1986; Hirst & 
Sherman, 1985; Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984). Studies using more pro- 
cess-sensitive measures (e.g., reaction times, think-aloud protocols) 
would be needed to further clarify this issue. 
The high confidence with the No-Choice-100 method is opposite to the 
hypothesis that choice would increase confidence. This hypothesis was 
inspired by self-perception theory (Bern, 1967), by early versions of dis- 
sonance theory (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Festinger, 1957) and by an ex- 
ploratory study reported by Fischhoff et al. (1977, Experiment 1). In the 
Fischhoff et al. study, more subjects were completely sure of their an- 
swers when they used a format analogous to our Choice-50 method (their 
Format 3), than when they used a procedure analogous to our No- 
Choice-100 method (their Format 4). The reason for the discrepant 
findings is not clear, but it is notable that the specific items differed some- 
what from group to group in the Fischhoff et al. study, while the same 
items were used in all conditions in the current study. Since confidence 
varies greatly from item to item, this could explain the discrepancy. 
Though the current findings demonstrate that choice does not always in- 
crease confidence, they should not be taken as strong evidence against 
the hypothesis that (other things being equal) choice increases conti- 
dence. It could be that choosing an answer increased subjects’ confi- 
dence, but that some other feature of the No-Choice-100 method (such as 
the focusing of attention) increased confidence even more. 
Evaluating the No-Choice-100 method is easier than understanding all 
of its effects. This method leads subjects to be especially overconfident 
and biased toward the precircled answer. Clearly this is not a very good 
method of probability assessment for two-alternative general-knowledge 
questions like those in the current experiment. This negative evaluation 
of the No-Choice-100 method should not be overgeneralized to all as- 
sessment methods using a full (lOO-point) scale. Full-scale methods are 
very commonly used and seem quite natural when the same kind of event 
(e.g., precipitation) is being repeatedly predicted. The results do, how- 
ever, raise the possibility that the Choice-50 method may be superior to 
full-scale methods even for repeated forecasts of the same kind of event. 
For instance, it is not out of the question that precipitation forecasts 
would be even better than they already are (Murphy 8z Brown, 1984; 
Murphy & Winkler, 1984) if meteorologists first indicated whether they 
thought “Precipitation” or “No precipitation” was more likely, then re- 
ported their confidence in the chosen alternative. Further research is re- 
quired to assess the merits of full-scale and half-scale methods for such 
topics. 
Choice-100. In this method the subject was instructed to circle his or 
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her preferred answer and to assign a probability between 0.00 and 1.00 
that the circled answer was correct. This method resulted in the lowest 
confidence and overconfidence, the best calibration (lowest reliability-in- 
the-small), and the most scatter. The high excess variance was entirely 
due to subjects who assigned probabilities below SO to their preferred 
answers. The low confidence and overconfidence were only partially due 
to these subjects. The good calibration (low reliability-in-the-small) was 
not due to these subjects. 
Most of the probabilities below 50 were reported by subjects who mis- 
used the probability scale. These subjects used probabilities less than SO 
to indicate very low confidence. Some subjects, however, used probabili- 
ties below SO to indicate that they preferred the answer they did not 
circle. 
Although the reduction in overconfidence and improved calibration 
make the Choice-100 method somewhat attractive, these benefits are 
countered by the difftculty of interpreting probabilities below .50. In our 
opinion, this disadvantage is more important than the advantage. So it 
seems that the standard Choice-50 method is the most appropriate of the 
three methods tested in this study. 
Sciedjk utility of measuring separate components of forecaster per- 
formance. Use of a variety of measures of different aspects of judgment 
quality proved to be helpful in finding and explaining substantively im- 
portant differences in forecaster performance. The measures permitted 
the identification of various problems which differed in severity across 
topics and methods of probability assessment: (a) failure to select the 
correct answer (especially for basketball predictions); (b) failure to assign 
higher probabilities to correct than to incorrect answers (especially for 
basketball predictions); (c) poor calibration (especially for general-knowl- 
edge questions and the No-Choice-100 method); (d) overconfidence 
(especially for general-knowledge questions and the No-Choice-100 
method); (e) high scatter (especially for general-knowledge questions and 
the Choice-100 method); (f) utilization of an irrelevant cue (the circled 
answers in the No-Choice-100 method); (g) failure to follow instructions 
(circling one’s less preferred answer when using the Choice-100 method); 
and (h) misuse of the probability scale (i.e., assigning probabilities below 
-50 to indicate low confidence). These effects were generally interpret- 
able and contributed to our understanding of probability judgment. In 
addition, examination of measures of several aspects of judgments re- 
vealed that the strongest individual consistency was in the overall level of 
confidence. Thus, looking at the components was scientifically useful. 
These findings suggest that it will be valuable for future research to use a 
broad selection of measures to facilitate understanding of influences on 
probability judgment. 
Applications. Several recommendations can be drawn directly from the 
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results of this study. First, since the No-Choice-100 method produced 
high overconfidence and invited subjects to use an irrelevant cue, its use 
for judgments of nonrepetitive events should be avoided. Second, since 
the subjects using the Choice-100 method often gave ambiguous re- 
sponses (probabilities below SO for their preferred answers), this method 
should also be avoided. Of the methods included in this experiment, the 
standard Choice-50 method seems most suitable. It should be remem- 
bered, however, that the experiment did not test the usefulness of full- 
scale methods for judgments of repetitive events, like precipitation. Such 
methods may be highly appropriate. Third, since the quality of a sub- 
ject’s basketball predictions was not highly correlated with the quality of 
his or her probability assessments for general-knowledge questions, one 
should not use a test of general-knowledge questions to select basketball 
oddsmakers. More generally, screening tests for judges should consist of 
questions for the same subject matter and (if possible) time frame as the 
forecasts that will be made on the job. 
The success of using a wide selection of measures in identifying reli- 
able and interpretable effects suggests that measurement of separate 
components may have many other applications as well. Since different 
types of training are needed to overcome different types of judgment 
errors, measures of separate components of probability judgment skill 
may be particularly useful for selecting appropriate forms of training. 
Judges who have difficulty choosing the most likely outcome can be 
helped by theoretical information about what cues are relevant and irrele- 
vant, and practice in identifying and using those cues. 
Judges who are overconfident, underconfident, or otherwise poorly 
calibrated need entirely different information. They can be helped with 
feedback about the proportion of their judgments (at each level of confi- 
dence) that turned out to be correct. For example, a judge could be in- 
formed that 78% of his or her judgments assigned 100% confidence 
turned out to be correct; that 72% of his or her judgments assigned 90% 
confidence turned out to be correct, etc. This would be expected to help 
judges bring their subjective probabilities into agreement with their hit 
rates (cf. Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980). Incentives and direct sugges- 
tions to lower (or raise) their probabilities may also be useful (Fischer, 
1982). Other kinds of errors in probability judgment (e.g., scatter) may 
require other kinds of training. The use of the measures of components of 
skill in probability judgment for the selection of training procedures 
seems very promising. Clearly there is a need for research on this possi- 
bility. 
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